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Abstract
By definition, risk taking involves uncertainty surrounding potential outcomes. However, risky decisions can vary in 
the amount of ambiguity about the likelihood of each outcome occurring. The current study tested the hypothesis 
that the amount of ambiguity in risky-decisions would moderate the relationship between risk taking and anxiety. 
In this study, participants completed individual difference measures and then a version of the Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task (BART) with either high or low ambiguity about the likelihood of a negative outcome. As hypothesized, 
higher levels of anxiety predicted less risk taking in the high ambiguity version of the BART, but anxiety and risk 
taking were unrelated to one another in the low ambiguity version. This study demonstrates that in order to 
understand the relationship between anxiety and risk taking, ambiguity level must be taken into account. 
Furthermore, this finding provides support for cognitive models of anxiety suggesting that anxious individuals 
interpret negative outcomes as more likely to occur than less anxious individuals.
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1 In Texas Hold'em, if Neil has a flush draw (i.e., he only
flush) on the flop, there is a 34.97% chance he will comp
(i.e., fourth card) or the river (i.e., fifth card).a b s t r a c tBy definition, risk taking involves uncertainty surrounding potential outcomes. However, risky decisions can vary
in the amount of ambiguity about the likelihood of each outcome occurring. The current study tested the hypoth-
esis that the amount of ambiguity in risky-decisions would moderate the relationship between risk taking and
anxiety. In this study, participants completed individual difference measures and then a version of the Balloon
Analogue Risk Task (BART) with either high or low ambiguity about the likelihood of a negative outcome. As
hypothesized, higher levels of anxiety predicted less risk taking in the high ambiguity version of the BART, but
anxiety and risk taking were unrelated to one another in the low ambiguity version. This study demonstrates
that in order to understand the relationship between anxiety and risk taking, ambiguity level must be taken
into account. Furthermore, this finding provides support for cognitive models of anxiety suggesting that anxious







People often make decisions in situations with uncertain outcomes.
For example, Vanessa, who is running late for work, might choose to
drive faster than the speed limit in an attempt to get to work on time.
Or, while playing poker, Neil might place a large bet knowing that he
will only win the hand if he gets a spade and completes his flush. What
unites these risky situations is the potential for a negative outcome
(Vanessa gets a speeding ticket, Neil loses the hand). One important
distinction between these situations, however, is that the likelihood of
a negative outcome is much less clear for Vanessa than Neil. Neil can
precisely compute the likelihood that he will get the needed spade,1
but it is much more difficult for Vanessa. (How likely is it that she will
pass a police officer on her way to work?) The current study was de-
signed to investigate risky decisions in situations that differed in terms
of the ambiguity surrounding the likelihood of the negative outcome.
People's tendency to seek or avoid taking risks is related to a number
of individual differences, including age (Figner, Mackinlay,Wilkening, &
Weber, 2009), gender (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), emotional state
(Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004), and personality characteristics
(Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O'Creevy, & Willman, 2005; Lauriola &Appalachian State University,
 needs one card to complete his 
lete his flush on either the turn Levin, 2001). One factor that has received a considerable amount of
attention is trait anxiety. Because anxiety is associated with pessimistic
expectations regarding future events (e.g., Shepperd, Grace, Cole, &
Klein, 2005), high anxiety might act as a signal to avoid taking risks. In
support of this assumption, numerous studies have found that people
with higher levels of anxiety tend to be risk-averse (e.g., Giorgetta
et al., 2012; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). For example,
Maner et al. (2007) found that trait anxiety was negatively correlated
with participants' risk-taking behavior. However, this finding has not
been universal, and studies investigating the relation this relationship
have sometimes generated contradictory results. For example, Mitte
(2007) conducted two similar studies and found the expected relation-
ship between anxiety and risk taking in the first study, but not the sec-
ond. A number of variables have been investigated in an effort to explain
these conflicting results, including both situation- and person-specific
constructs. The domain of the risk, for instance, appears to influence
anxious individuals' risk-taking behaviors, with studies suggesting
that individuals with high anxiety are more likely to take health-
related risks but less likely to take risks in most other domains
(e.g., recreation, career, and finance; Nicholson et al., 2005). Similarly,
Lauriola, Russo, Lucidi, Violani, and Levin (2005) found that the way
risky healthdecisionswere framedmoderated the relationship between
anxiety and risk taking. When making a choice between safe and risky
options that were framed positively, anxiety did not predict partici-
pants' choices. However, when the options were framed negatively,
higher anxiety was related to risk-seeking choices.
One variable that has received relatively little attention in the litera-
ture on the relation between anxiety and risk taking is the level of
ambiguity involved in the likelihood of outcomes. Cognitive models of
anxiety propose that anxious individuals exhibit biases for threat-
related information and a propensity to interpret ambiguous stimuli
as more threatening and negative outcomes as more likely to occur
than less anxious individuals, which may in turn affect their ability to
process non-threat information and impair decision-making (Butler &
Mathews, 1987; Clark &Wells, 1995). A relatively large and accumulat-
ing body of research appears to support these models (e.g., Butler &
Mathews, 1987; Maner & Schmidt, 2006). For example, patients with
Social Anxiety Disorder exhibit threat interpretation biases toward am-
biguous social stimuli on both reaction time and self-report measures
(Beard & Amir, 2009), and individuals with high levels of trait anxiety
demonstrate impaired discriminatory fear learning under conditions
of ambiguity (Arnaudova et al., 2013; Lommen, Engelhard, & van den
Hout, 2010). Further, preliminary research suggests that highly anxious
individuals may exhibit impaired decision-making on tasks that involve
risk with high levels of ambiguity (e.g., the Iowa Gambling Task; IGT),
but not low levels of ambiguity (e.g., the Game of Dice Task; Kim et al.,
2015; Zhang et al., 2015). However, these studies have been limited in
several respects. For example, these tasks differ in a number of ways
other than their levels of ambiguity. Therefore, it is difficult to know
whether the observed differences were due to the level of ambiguity
or some other feature of the tasks. In addition, these studies have
often relied on comparisons of relatively small samples of individuals
with a diagnosed anxiety disorder (e.g., OCD; Kim et al., 2015; Zhang
et al., 2015) versus matched controls, despite noting that most of the
clinical patients were taking anxiolytic or antidepressant medications
at the time of the assessment, which may have impacted their
performance. Furthermore, these studies have not examined additional
constructs (e.g., dispositional optimism) thatmight partially account for
the relationship between anxiety and risk taking. Thus, additional re-
search using tasks that differ only in the ambiguity about the likelihood
of the outcomes and assessing a range of constructs is needed to clarify
the relation between anxiety, risk taking, and ambiguity.1.1. Current study
Given the inconsistencies observed in previous studies (e.g., Mitte,
2007), indications that the relationship between anxiety and risk taking
is moderated by various factors (e.g., Nicholson et al., 2005; Lauriola
et al., 2005), and preliminary evidence suggesting that ambiguity may
be particularly relevant to risky decision-making among anxious indi-
viduals (Kim et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2015), the goal of the present
study was to investigate whether the level of ambiguity involved in a
risky decision would moderate the relationship between anxiety and
risk taking. Based on previous research, we hypothesized that anxiety
would predict risk taking under conditions of high ambiguity, but not
under conditions of low ambiguity.2. Method
2.1. Participants
One hundred and twenty-four (77.4% women, 22.6% men;
Mage = 19.64, SDage = 2.52) undergraduate students from a univer-
sity in the Southeastern region of the United States participated as
partial fulfillment of a course requirement.2.2. Measures
Participants completedmeasures of depression, anxiety, stress, opti-
mism, and risk taking. We included measures of depression, stress, and
optimism to ensure that the observed relationship between anxiety and
risk taking was not driven by another, related construct.2.2.1. Depression, anxiety, and stress
Participants completed a computerized version of the 21-item
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond &
Lovibond, 1995). For each item on this scale, participants indicate
how often they experienced a situation over the past week using a
1 (“Did not apply to me at all. NEVER”) to 4 (“Applied to me very
much, or most of the time. ALMOST ALWAYS”) point response
scale. Example items are “I felt down-hearted and blue” (depres-
sion), “I felt I was close to panic” (anxiety), and “I found it difficult
to relax” (stress). In the current sample, internal consistency was
relatively good for depression (α = .88) and anxiety (α = .72), and
acceptable for stress (α = .67).2.2.2. Dispositional optimism
Participants completed a computerized version of the Life Orienta-
tion Task—Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). This 10-
item scale (6 critical items and 4 fillers) assesses participants' level of
dispositional optimism. Participants indicate their level of agreement
with each item on a 1 (“I disagree a lot”) to 5 (“I agree a lot”) point re-
sponse scale. An example item is “In uncertain times, I usually expect
the best”. In the current sample, the scale had relatively good internal
consistency (α = .78).2.2.3. Risk taking
Participants completed a slightlymodified version of the Balloon An-
alogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). Risk taking, asmeasured by
the BART, correlates with a variety of risk taking behaviors, including
risky sexual behavior (Lejuez, Simmons, Aklin, Daughters, & Dvir,
2004) and alcohol consumption (Fernie, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2010).
The BART is a computerized task inwhich participants pumpupnumer-
ous balloons, one at a time. Each pump of a balloon earnsfive points and
participants can collect points at any time. If they collect the points for a
given balloon, that round is over, and they move to the next balloon. If
the balloon explodes before they collect the points, they lose all the
points for that round. With each pump of the balloon, the likelihood of
the balloon exploding increases. This task requires that participants
weigh the likelihood of the negative outcome (i.e., the balloon explodes
and all points for that round are lost) with the potential gains
(i.e., getting 5 points for each pump).
We included three different balloon colors (blue, purple, and gray),
each with a different initial likelihood of exploding. The blue balloon
had a 1/10 chance of exploding on the first pump, the purple balloon
had a 1/20 chance, and the gray balloon had a 1/40 chance. With each
pump, the chance of explosion increased by decreasing the denomina-
tor by 1. For example, the blue balloon had a 1/9 chance of exploding
on the second pump, a 1/8 chance of exploding on the third pump,
and so on.
Most importantly, we created two versions of the BART—one with
relatively high ambiguity about the likelihood that the balloons would
explode and one with relatively low ambiguity. The high ambiguity
version closely replicated the classic version of the BART. Participants
were told that the explosion likelihood of the three balloons varied,
but they were not told what the likelihoods were.
The low ambiguity version included a visual indicator to let the
participants know each balloon's explosion likelihood (see Fig. 1).
The visual indicator consisted of an array of balls on the right side
of the screen. The participants were told that the computer picked
a ball at random each time the balloon was pumped. If the computer
picked a green ball, the balloon did not explode. If the computer
picked the red ball, the balloon exploded. Each time the participant
pumped up the balloon, a green ball was removed from the array to
show the current explosion likelihood. Aside from the visual indica-
tor of the explosion likelihood, the high and low ambiguity versions
of the BART were identical.
2 Participants' adjusted pump scores and average (unadjusted) pumps per round were
highly correlated, r(122)= .98, p b .001. Therefore, analyses conducted on average pumps
rather than adjusted pump scores were virtually identical.
3 In addition to examining participants' overall adjusted pump scores, we also conduct-
ed separate analyses for each of the three balloons. A similar, but not identical pattern of
results was observed for the three balloons. For all three balloons, anxiety did not predict
risk taking (ps N .50). For all three balloons, ambiguity predicted risk taking (all ps b .001).
With the purple and gray balloon, participants' adjusted pump scores were higher in the
low ambiguity condition. However, with the blue balloon, scores were higher in the high
ambiguity condition. Finally, there was the predicted interaction between anxiety level
and ambiguity version for the purple (p = .03) and gray (p = .005) balloons, but not
the blue balloon (p= .20).
Fig. 1. Screenshots of the low ambiguity version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task before
the first pump (top) and after the 6th pump (bottom).2.3. Procedure
After providing their consent, participants completed the DASS and
LOT-R. Participants were then randomly assigned to complete either
the high or low ambiguity version of the BART. To motivate the
participants in their task, they were told that performance on the
task is related to real-world decision-making skills. They were also
told that they would see their score and the average person's score
at the end of the study. Furthermore, the participants were told
that their task was to score as many points as possible because the
more points they earned, the more reward (candy) they would
receive.
The participants received instructions about the BART and went
through 5 practice rounds. During the practice rounds the balloon was
yellow in order to limit learning the explosion rates. Aside from the
second practice round, the explosion likelihoods of the practice balloons
were 1/15 on the first pump. On the second practice round, the balloon
exploded on the first pump. This ensured that every participant
experienced an explosion during the practice rounds. After the
practice rounds, the participants completed 60 rounds. The rounds
were presented in two blocks of 30 rounds—10 per balloon
color—with the order of the balloons randomized within each
block. After completing the 60 rounds, the participants were asked
their age and gender, were shown their score and the average
participant's score (from a pilot study), and given their earned reward
based on their performance.3. Results
3.1. Relationships between individual differences
For each participant, we calculated the average of their responses for
the depression, stress, anxiety, and optimism scales. As shown in
Table 1, higher levels of anxietywere associatedwith greater depression
and stress, but lower optimism.
3.2. Risk taking
Participants' adjusted pumps for each balloon color (see Lejuez
et al., 2002) were calculated by computing the average number of
times the participant pumped up the balloon for all the rounds
when the balloon did not explode. Therefore, the adjusted pumps is
the average number of pumps for the rounds when the participant
made the choice to stop pumping up the balloon (rather than the choice
being made for him/her because the balloon exploded).2 Higher
adjusted pump scores indicate greater risk taking.
A 3 (balloon color: blue, purple, and gray) × 2 (ambiguity version:
low or high) analysis of variance on participants' adjusted pump
scores revealed a main effect of balloon color, F(2, 121) = 188.62,
p b .001, ηp2 = .76. Participants' adjusted pump scores were higher
for the balloons that exploded less often. There was also amain effect
of ambiguity version, F(1, 122) = 41.85, p b .001, ηp2 = .26.
Participants who went through the low ambiguity version of the
BART exhibited higher levels of risk taking (i.e., had higher adjusted
pump scores) than participants who went through the high ambigu-
ity version. Finally, the analysis revealed a balloon color × ambiguity
version interaction, F(2, 121)= 64.06, p b .001, ηp2= .51. As shown in
Fig. 2, the adjusted pump scores for the participants who went
through the low-ambiguity version varied across the three balloon
colors to a greater extent than participants who went through the
high-ambiguity version.
In short, participants were sensitive to the explosion rates of the
three balloons, and participants who went through the low ambiguity
version were more sensitive to these differences than participants
who went through the high ambiguity version of the BART. These
results suggest that the two versions of the BART varied with regards
to the amount of ambiguity about the likelihoods of the balloons
exploding.
3.3. Relationship between risk taking and anxiety
In order to test our hypothesis that the relationship between anxiety
and risk taking is moderated by ambiguity, we combined participants'
average adjusted pump scores for all three balloons.3 We used the
PROCESS SPSS macro (Hayes, 2013) to conduct a regression analysis
with participants' anxiety score as the predictor, the ambiguity version
as themoderator, and the participants' adjusted pump score as the out-
come variable. In this analysis, the variables were mean centered and
we added participants' gender, age, and levels of depression, stress,
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and relationships among participant characteristics.
Mean (SD) Depression Anxiety Stress Optimism Age Gender
Depression 1.53 (0.49) – .43⁎⁎⁎ .31⁎⁎⁎ −.57⁎⁎⁎ −.01 0.07
Anxiety 1.47 (0.41) – .42⁎⁎⁎ −.47⁎⁎⁎ .00 −0.09
Stress 1.91 (0.41) – −.33⁎⁎⁎ −.03 −0.18
Optimism 3.39 (0.72) – −.03 −0.23





Note:Depression, anxiety, and stress coded on a 1–4 point scale; optimism coded on a 1–5 point scale; values listed for relationships betweendepression, anxiety, stress, optimism, and age
are r-values. Values listed for relationship with gender are d-values with positive numbers indicating higher values for men and negative numbers indicating higher values for women.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.and optimismas covariates.4 This analysis revealed that, overall, anxiety
did not predict participants' adjusted pump scores, t = −0.74,
b = −0.39, p = .46, 95% CI [−1.44, 0.66]. The ambiguity version did
predict risk taking, t = 5.63, b = 2.01, p b .001, 95% CI [1.30, 2.71].
Most importantly, therewas a significant anxiety × ambiguity condition
interaction, t = 2.45, b = 2.17, p = .016, 95% CI [0.42, 3.93]. This
interaction explained a significant proportion of the variance, R2 = .04,
F(1, 115) = 6.00, p = .016. Fig. 3 plots the relationship at one SD above
and one SD below the mean of participants' anxiety score. Simple effects
analyses revealed that for the participants who went through the high
ambiguity version of the BART, higher anxiety was associated with less
risk taking, t = −2.23, b = −1.50, p = .03, 95% CI [−2.82, −0.17].
However, in the low ambiguity version, anxiety and risk taking were un-
related to one another, t=0.97, b=0.68, p= .34, 95% CI [−0.73, 2.08].
This analysis also revealed that gender predicted participants'
adjusted pump scores, t = −2.25, b = −0.99, p = .03, 95% CI [−1.86,
−0.12]—a result consistent with previous studies findings that men
generally take more risks than women (Byrnes et al., 1999). None of
the other covariates significantly predicted risk taking (all ps N .27).4. Discussion
The current study investigated whether the amount of ambiguity in
the likelihood of a negative outcome moderates the relationship be-
tween anxiety and risk taking. Consistent with our prediction, when
the likelihood of the negative outcome was ambiguous, participants
with higher anxiety exhibited less risk taking. Thisfinding replicates nu-
merous other studies demonstrating that anxiety and risk taking are
often negatively related (e.g., Giorgetta et al., 2012; Maner & Schmidt,
2006). Most notably, Maner et al. (2007, Study 2) found that anxious
individuals took fewer risks as measured by the BART—the same risk-
taking measure used in the current study. While the results in the
high ambiguity condition replicated previous studies, the pattern was
different in the low ambiguity condition. When the likelihood of the
negative outcome was relatively unambiguous, there was not a signifi-
cant relationship between anxiety and risk taking. Anxious individuals
were, on average, no more risk-seeking or risk-avoidant than their less
anxious counterparts. This finding appears consistent with cognitive
models of anxiety and suggests that, in the absence of information re-
garding the probability of positive and negative outcomes, the tendency
of anxious persons to perceive increased threat and higher probability
of negative outcomes may lead them to being less willing to engage in
risk taking behaviors.4 A similar analysis predicting participants' adjusted pump scores while not controlling
for gender, age, depression, stress, and optimism yielded similar results. Specifically, anx-
iety did not predict participants' adjusted pump scores, t=0.09, b=0.04, p= .93, 95% CI
[−0.83, 0.91]. The ambiguity version did predict risk taking, t = 5.73, b = 2.05, p b .001,
95% CI [1.34, 2.76]. Most importantly, there was a significant anxiety × ambiguity condi-
tion interaction, t = 2.68, b = 2.36, p = .008, 95% CI [0.62, 4.11].Although previous research has revealed high levels of uncertainty
to be associated with reduced risk taking, the current study suggests
that the relationship between anxiety and risk takingmay not be driven
solely by the uncertainty involved in risky-decisions. Both the high and
low ambiguity versions of the BART involved uncertainty in that each
time the balloon was pumped, there was a chance it would explode.
Rather, what separated the two versions was that one version had out-
comes that were relatively ambiguous and the other had outcomes that
were relatively unambiguous. Thus, these results are consistentwith the
finding that intolerance of uncertainty and intolerance of ambiguity,
while related, appear to be distinct constructs (Rosen, Ivanova, &
Knäuper, 2014; but see Lauriola, Levin, &Hart, 2007), and it is important
for research to consider both constructs with regard to the decision-
making strategies of anxious individuals.
While our study adds to the literature regarding anxiety and risk tak-
ing, some limitationswarrant acknowledgment. Perhaps themost nota-
ble limitation was the use of a non-clinical, undergraduate student
sample. Although the pattern of results in the present studywas largely
consistent with previous research utilizing clinical samples, additional
research is needed to determine whether these findings will extend to
samples with clinical levels of anxiety. In addition, the present study
only employed one measure of risk-taking behavior, and it is not clear
whether these findings will extend to other behavioral risk-takingmea-
sures (e.g., the IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; the
Cups Task, Levin & Hart, 2003). Previous research has suggested that
performance on one task is not always correlated with performance
on another task (Bishara et al., 2009), whichmay be at least partially re-
lated to the level of ambiguity surrounding the outcomes. For example,
the BART and IGT require participants to learn the probabilities while
going through the task, whereas the likelihoods in the Cups Task are
clearly observable by the participants. Future research could investigate
the relationship between anxiety and risk taking across differentFig. 2. Participants' average adjusted pump scores as a function of balloon color and BART
version. Error bars represent ±1 SE.
Fig. 3. Participants average adjusted pump scores as a function of their level of anxiety and
BART version.behavioral tasks that vary in respect to the amount of ambiguity regard-
ing the likelihood of the outcomes.
Finally, a possible limitation in the current study is that the partici-
pants were not given monetary incentives for their performance on
the BART; instead, they received points so they could get a non-
monetary reward (i.e., candy). Ferrey and Mishra (2014) recently
demonstrated that the compensation method used in the BART may
affect participants' risk taking, with participants who were paid for
their participation in addition to being paid based on their performance
tending to take more risks than participants who were only paid for
their performance or not paid at all. While our compensation method
might have influenced participants' risk taking, it seems unlikely that
this can account for the interactive effect of ambiguity and anxiety on
risk-taking behavior. Future research is needed to assess whether
alternative compensation methods may impact the relation between
ambiguity, risk-taking, and anxiety.
Despite the need for further research, the current study demon-
strates that in order to understand the relationship between anxiety
and risk taking, the ambiguity level must be taken into account. This is
especially important because many real-world decisions vary in terms
of the ambiguity surrounding the likelihood of the outcomes. Further-
more, this finding provides additional support for cognitive models of
anxiety suggesting that anxious individuals interpret ambiguous stimuli
asmore threatening and negative outcomes asmore likely to occur than
less anxious individuals.References
Arnaudova, I., Krypotos, A. -M., Effting, M., Boddez, Y., Kindt, M., & Beckers, T. (2013).
Individual differences in discriminatory fear learning under conditions of ambiguity:
A vulnerability factor for anxiety disorders? Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1–9. http://dx.
doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00298.
Beard, C., & Amir, N. (2009). Interpretation in social anxiety: When meaning precedes
ambiguity. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 33(4), 406–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/s10608-009-9235-0.
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to future
consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50(1–3),
7–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3.
Bishara, A. J., Pleskac, T. J., Fridberg, D. J., Yechiam, E., Lucas, J., Busemeyer, J. R., ... Stout, J. C.
(2009). Similar processes despite divergent behavior in two commonly used
measures of risky decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22(4),
435–454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.641.
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk perception. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 11(5), 551–565. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01183858.
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 367–383. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.125.3.367.Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M.
R. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, assessment,
and treatment (pp. 69–93). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Fernie, G., Cole, J. C., Goudie, A. J., & Field, M. (2010). Risk-taking but not response inhibi-
tion or delay discounting predict alcohol consumption in social drinkers. Drug and
Alcohol Dependence, 112(1–2), 54–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2010.
05.011.
Ferrey, A. E., & Mishra, S. (2014). Compensation method affects risk-taking in the Balloon
Analogue Risk Task. Personality and Individual Differences, 64, 111–114. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.02.008.
Fessler, D. T., Pillsworth, E. G., & Flamson, T. J. (2004). Angry men and disgusted women:
An evolutionary approach to the influence of emotions on risk taking. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 95(1), 107–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
obhdp.2004.06.006.
Figner, B., Mackinlay, R. J., Wilkening, F., & Weber, E. U. (2009). Affective and deliberative
processes in risky choice: Age differences in risk taking in the Columbia Card Task.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(3),
709–730. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014983.
Giorgetta, C., Grecucci, A., Zuanon, S., Perini, L., Balestrieri, M., Bonini, N., ... Brambilla, P.
(2012). Reduced risk-taking behavior as a trait feature of anxiety. Emotion, 12(6),
1373–1383. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029119.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis:
A regression-based approach. New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
Kim, H. W., Kang, J. I., Namkoong, K., Jhung, K., Ha, R. Y., & Kim, S. J. (2015). Further evi-
dence of a dissociation between decision-making under ambiguity and decision-
making under risk in obsessive–compulsive disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders,
176, 118–124.
Lauriola, M., & Levin, I. P. (2001). Personality traits and risky decision-making in a con-
trolled experimental task: An exploratory study. Personality and Individual
Differences, 31(2), 215–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00130-6.
Lauriola, M., Levin, I. P., & Hart, S. S. (2007). Common and distinct factors in decision mak-
ing under ambiguity and risk: A psychometric study of individual differences.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 104(2), 130–149. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2007.04.001.
Lauriola, M., Russo, P. M., Lucidi, F., Violani, C., & Levin, I. P. (2005). The role of personality
in positively and negatively framed risky health decisions. Personality and Individual
Differences, 38(1), 45–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.03.020.
Lejuez, C.W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L., ... Brown, R.
A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk taking: The Balloon Analogue
Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(2), 75–84. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.8.2.75.
Lejuez, C. W., Simmons, B. L., Aklin, W. M., Daughters, S. B., & Dvir, S. (2004). Risk-taking
propensity and risky sexual behavior of individuals in residential substance use treat-
ment. Addictive Behaviors, 29(8), 1643–1647. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.
2004.02.035.
Levin, I. P., & Hart, S. S. (2003). Risk preferences in young children: Early evidence of in-
dividual differences in reaction to potential gains and losses. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 16(5), 397–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.453.
Lommen, M. J. J., Engelhard, L. M., & van den Hout, M. A. (2010). Neuroticism and avoid-
ance of ambiguous stimuli: Better safe than sorry? Personality and Individual
Differences, 49, 1001–1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.08.012.
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: Com-
parison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck Depression and
Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3), 335–343. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U.
Maner, J. K., & Schmidt, N. B. (2006). The role of risk avoidance in anxiety. Behavior
Therapy, 37, 181–189. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2005.11.003.
Maner, J. K., Richey, J. A., Cromer, K., Mallott, M., Lejuez, C. W., Joiner, T. E., & Schmidt, N. B.
(2007). Dispositional anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making. Personality and
Individual Differences, 42(4), 665–675. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.016.
Mitte, K. (2007). Anxiety and risky decision-making: The role of subjective probability
and subjective costs of negative events. Personality and Individual Differences, 43(2),
243–253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.11.028.
Nicholson, N., Soane, E., Fenton-O'Creevy, M., & Willman, P. (2005). Personality and
domain-specific risk taking. Journal of Risk Research, 8(2), 157–176. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/1366987032000123856.
Rosen, N. O., Ivanova, E., & Knäuper, B. (2014). Differentiating intolerance of uncertainty
from three related but distinct constructs. Anxiety, Stress & Coping: An International
Journal, 27(1), 55–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10615806.2013.815743.
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Bridges,M.W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from neurot-
icism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): A reevaluation of the Life Ori-
entation Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 1063–1078. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1063.
Shepperd, J. A., Grace, J., Cole, L. J., & Klein, C. (2005). Anxiety and outcome predictions.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 267–275. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0146167204271322.
Zhang, L., Dong, Y., Yifu, J., Zhu, C., Yu, H., Chen, X., & Wang, K. (2015). Dissociation of
decision making under ambiguity and decision making under risk: A neurocognitive
endophenotype candidate for obsessive–compulsive disorder. Progress in Neuro-
Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 57, 60–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
pnpbp.2014.09.005.
